The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in its recent decisions regarding the Cyprus problem such as the Loizidou v. Turkey
I. The Kuropcan Court of Human Rights and the Cyprus Problem

IıUroduction
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has been delivering judgements m vvhich Turkey is found responsible for the current situation in the Islanıl. The Loizicloıt v. Turkey. 1 and the Case of Cyprus v. Turkey are the nıain deeisions in this regard ard it is likely to follovv by nıore eases vvhich vvill be brought before the ECHR. According to these judgements, Turkey violates the human rights of tlıe Greek Cypriots living in the north of the Island before the military intervention of Turkey took place in 1974. in the vievv of the Court, among olhers, Turkey is guilty of: failing to investıgale the dcaths of about 1.500 people vvho disappeared in the military intervention. mimimin treatment of fıe families of missing Greek Cypriots. denying some 180.000 Greek Cypriots the right to return to their homes, failure to compensate for loss of property and interference with freedom of religion.
When the vievv deployed by the ECHR in relation to the Cyprus Case is e\amined it can easily be seen that it is not in compliance \vith the rules of international lavv and more importan.ly inconsistent \vith the realilies of the Island. The judgements are polilically motivated and wholly ignores the Cyprus problem. The judgements wcre based on the fact that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is not legally established and also not recognised by tlıe international community as an inclependent State. Moreover, since Turkey exercises effective overall control of northern Cyprus through its military presence, it should be responsible for the alleged violations of human rights there. This way of understanding and the application of the rules of international lavv does not give any vveight to the causes and effecls of the events vvhich took place in Cyprus t rom 1963 to 1974, to the factors vvhich lead the Turkish Cypriots to establish their ovvn inclependent States.
The aim of this paper is to challenge the legality of the ECHR judgements in the light of the rules of international lavv. To that end, firstly, the Cyprus problem and the reasons for the establishment of the TRNC vvill be briel'K explained. Secondlv. the concept of statehood and recognition of a State and. in this sense the TRNC case, vvill be discussed. Lastly. the deeisions of ıhe ECHR vvill be assessed.
C.50S;ı.3 ECHR AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM
14?
Historical Background to the Cyprus Problem
The Island of Cyprus, situated 40 miles from the south of Turkey, and approximately 500 miles from the south-east of the Greek mainland, has an area of 3.572 square miles and is the third largest island in the Mediterranean Sea. According to the census of 1960 the population of Cyprus was 573.566, consisting of 441.656 Greeks, 104.942 Turks, and 26.968 Maronites, Armenians, Latins and other races. The population is currently estimated to be about 700.000 of which 24 per cent of that population is thought to be Turkish Cypriots. This is not the definite population of Cyprus, since an island-wide census of Cyprus has not been conducted since 1960. 3 Because of its strategic position Cyprus has been under the influence of different races and religions from the earliest days of its history. in history, the Island of Cyprus had been a part of the Persian, Roman and Byzanüne empires. it became a Frankish Kingdom in 1193, in 1489 it was a Venetian dependency, and in 1571 the Ottoman Empire conquered the Island, but during its history a "Cypriot nation" has never been created. 4 in that time and to the present day, there have been two majör communities which are Greek Cypriots who belong to the Greek Orthodox Church and spcak Greek and Turkish Cypriots who are Moslems and speak Turkish."
1 Under the Ottoman rule, privileges and freedoms were given to the Orthodox Church. There was no hostility betvveen the Greek and Turkish populations, however they did not mix much socially. 6 IntermaiTİage between these two communities is not allowed. They have guarded their cultural and national heritages. Each community has regulated its own education system in its own language. 7 On 4 June 1878 the Ottoman Empire and Britain signed a Convention giving Britain the right to occupy and rule the Island, although not legally possess it. 8 The main reason for this was to protect the Ottoman Empire from Russia. 9 During the first World War, Britain annexed the Island (5 November 1914). Until the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, this situation was Turning now to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, the Constitution of Cyprus was based on two prior international agreements. The Zürich Agreement (11 February 1959) , concluded between Turkey and Greece, set out the "Basic Articles" of the Constitution. 20 it established a bicommunal constitutional framework for Cyprus and recognised the equality of the two communities. 21 The London Agreement was signed by the British Foreign Secretary and the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey. it comprised of a Memorandum and a collection of agreements which would facilitate 'the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus'. These agreements consisted of the texts of the third agreement, namely "The Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee" 22 that constitutes the 'Basic Structure of the Republic of Cyprus' and declarations made by the representatives of both communities approving the documents "as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus". in addition to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey and the British Foreign Secretary, the representatives of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities signed these documents. 23 On 16 August 1960, the British Colony of Cyprus became an independent State whose name was the Republic of Cyprus. After the above referred three multilateral treaties, Cyprus, the British Colony, achieved its independence. in the Treaty of Establishment, it vvas accepted that the Republic of Cyprus would have sovereignty över the Island, with the exception of two British military bases. in the Treaty of Guarantee, the signatories recognised and guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and "the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution". in the Treaty of Alliance, the parties agreed to resist any attack or aggression directed against the mdependence or territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. Great Britain vvas not party to the Treaty of Alliance. 24 The Constitution of Cyprus vvas carefully drafted and its Basic Articles recognised the equality of the tvvo communities and their obligation to share the attributes of sovereignty. Under this regulation the President of the Republic was a Greek Cypriot and the Vice-President vvas a Turkish Cypriot. Each community vvould select its official simultaneously but separately by majority votes of their respective communities. These officials were empovverecl lo veto in vvhole or in part any law relating to forcign affairs, dcfence or security.
1, The Council of Ministers, the House of Representatives. the judiciary, the military and the civil service vvere divided between the tvvo communities in accordance with the agrecd proportions. Ali legislative povver relating to the matters of religion, education. personal status, municipal institutions and affairs was regulated separately. 26 The Constitution of Cyprııs was very detailed and the reeime founded in Cvprus vvas very balanced.
According to the treaties and its Constitution. This movement can be seen as a part of the alleged "Akritas Plan".' 12 İt was drawn up in 1963 and was originally published by a local nevvspaper (Patris, on 21 April 1966). J3 The main purpose of the plan was to end the new republic. in compliance with this plan, the Greek Cypriot side claimed that the 1960 Constitution was unworkable and had to be amended. As indicated in the plan, the final purpose was cnosis which could have been achieved by means of self-determination. 34 Moreover, the Greek Cypriot side considered the Turkish Cypriot community as a "minority" in a Greekruled island, with no right of self-determination and this attitude is stili prevalent today. 3> As mentioned above, the Greek Cypriot side's attitude was obviously in violation of the treaties and the Zürich and London Agreements. This is because, they created a bi-communal State, not a nation.
The Turkish Cypriots and Turkey rejected the proposed constitutional changes. After the breakdown of the 1960 Constitution by the Greek Cypriot community, the uneasy years (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) began for the Turkish Cypriots. in December 1963 the intercommunal fighting began. On 21 December 1963 a Turkish couple were killed and after that, a majör attack on the Nicosian Turkish Cypriots was launched by the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots were generally defenceless since the Turkish poliçe had been disarmed because of a ruse on the part of the Greek Cypriot minister. During the 1963-64 crisis, as a result of Greek Cypriot violence against the Turkish Cypriotsparticularly in Nicosia and Lamaca -about 20.000 Turkish Cypriots fled from their 103 villages to safer areas.'
6 As a consequence of this violence, the Turkish Cypriots were left as "stateless persons" in their homeland. in order to prevent any further violence, the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force (UNFICYP) was sent to the island in 1964." The aim of this paper is not to give detailed information about the Cyprus problem as information concerning the period of the uneasy years can be found in detail 
The Reasons for the Establlishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Despite the breakdovvn of the 1960 Constitution and its unilateral amendment by the Greek Cypriots, the UN Security Council (Resolution 186) recognised the Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate government of Cyprus. This recognition and the subsequent recognition by other Statesexcept Turkey -of the Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate government of ali the Island is resented in Northern Cyprus. As a result of this situation, the Turkish Cypriots have had serious economic and other effects. 41 Since 1964 the Greek Cypriot State has claimed to be the sole government of the Republic of Cyprus, with power över the Island and its inhabitants. No legal basis can be found in intcrnational law for such a claim. 42 As indicated above, the legal status of the Greek Cypriot regime was an obvious violation of the Trealy of Guarantee, the Zürich and London Agreements and the 1960 Constitution. it is not the same government of the Republic of Cyprus which was recognised by the international community in 1960. Moreover, it is not the legitimate successor of that government. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot State had in 1964 and has today no right under international law to claim sovereign rights över the Turkish Cypriot community.
4 '' Currently the Greek Cypriot government represents only the Greek Cypriot community. in short, it is not the Republic of Cyprus vvhich vvas established and govemed by the treaties and the 1960 Constitution. 44 The establishment of a Greek Cypriot State in the South and its recognition as the legitimate government of vvhole island by the UN and international community together with the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side had respected the sanctity of the treaties and insisted on the implementation of the 1960 Constitution, caused the Turkish Cypriot people to decide to set up their own State. 44 Nccatigil. "The Cyprus Conflict", p. 56. 45 Nccatigil, "The Cyprus Conflict", p. 55.
to the present day, the Greek Cypriot government, which has claimed to be the government of the Republic of Cyprus, has not exercised any sovereign rights över the Turkish Cypriot community with regard to the important incidents of sovereign control reserved to the Republic of Cyprus government in its Constitution. 4 v On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot people deelared their independence under the name of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The decision of the Turkish Cypriot community should be aeeepted equal!y with those of the Greek Cypriot community. This is because. since 1963 (över 20 years) the Turkish Cypriot people have negotiated in good faith with the Greek Cypriot comrrunity in order to achieve a lasting political solution to the Cyprus problenv 4 During the negotiations betvveen, the two Cypriot communities under the auspices of the UN," this lasting political solution, a federation based on tvvo politically equal components, could not be achieved. The main reason for this failure vvas that the Greek Cypriots did not vvant to share the pover due to the continuing recognition of the Greek Cypriot government by the international community as the legitimate government of the vvhole island. For this reason and also due to the other reasons mentioned above, the Turkish Cypriots had to declare their independence under the name of the TRNC. 
The TRNC as an independent State
The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established as an independent State in the exercise of the right to şelf detennination by the Turkish Cypriot people on 15 November 1983. At this point, the question in relation to the legal status of the TRNC vvith regard to the elements of statehood. laid down by international law, vvill be briefly assessed here. in other vvords. does the TRNC, in fact, possess the criteria for statehood? The basic criteria for statehood reflecting tne customary international law rule ıs Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) 17 . These are: (a) permanent population; (b) a defined tcrritory; (c) a government; and (d) a capacity to enter into relations with other States (independence). 52 
Recognition, as will be seen below, is generally not accepted as a criterion for statehood. According to the constitutive theory, a State becomes a subject of international law only and exclusively through recognition, in short, recognition creates statehood in international law. in contrast to this theory, according to the declaratory or evidentiary theory, the concept of recognition is not a criterion for statehood. A State exists as a matter of fact, whether it is recognised or not. Recognition is nothing other than a formal acknowledgement of an established situation of fact.
38 in modern international law, almost ali international lawyers accept the declaratory theory due to the fact that it has often been recognised for political reasons.' 9 When the case of the TRNC is assessed in the light of the requirements of statehood the following results are found:
The first criterion for statehood is to have a permanent population. The TRNC has a population of 170.000 (99% Turks and 1% others). 60 The size of population is not important in deciding the question of statehood. As a recognised State, Nauru whose population is less than 10.000 proves this fact. San Marino. Tuvalu and the Vatican City are further examples of recognised States vvith small populations.
The second criterion is to have a defined territory. The territory of the TRNC covers 3.355 square kilometres 61 and its border of 189 kilometres runs from the tip of Karpas peninsula in the East to Erenköy in the North West. The boundary of the TRNC was defined in the case of the Green Line in Nicosia in 1964. in this sense, the UN Peace Keeping Force has played a central role. in particular, after 1974, the boundary line began to assume the qualification of an international boundary. 62 To be a State a certain frontier is not necessary. The situation of, Israel is the best example to shovv that even though its borders are not defined Israel is a recognised and a member State to the UN." in case law, the cases of Deutsche Continental Relating to the territory of the TRNC there are some poınls which need to be examined. The territory of the TRNC is 3.355 square kilometres \vhich is nearly 35.03 per cent. of the whole territory of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot side argues that the TRNC has no "territory" of its ovvn on the groıınd that the area of the TRNC belongs to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.'''' However, in the Geneva Declaration of 30 July 1974,"
7 as a result of evolutionary developnıents the existence of two separate and autonomous administrations -the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community -was aeeepted in the territory of the Republic of Cyprus by the Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the UK. Neither of these administrations existing on the Island are qualified to claim that they are the administration of the Republic of Cyprus.''^ Moreover, the Four Guidelines of 12 February 1977 69 agrecd upon by Mr. Denktas, President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. and Archbishop Makarios, the leader of the Greek Cypriot community, is an official acknovvledgement of the territory under the control of each separate community (Guideline section 2). in order to solve the Cyprus problem, it is generally accepted at present that the solution will be based upon the principle of bi -zonality/ 0
The other contention of the Greek Cypriot side is that the Turkish Cypriot community occupy the territory which is larger than their proportion of the who!c population of the Island. But it should be remembercd that most of Northern Cyprus is mountainous and arid. "Besides, the Turkish Cypriots need enough arable land to feed themselves -especially in view of the continuing efforts by the Greek Cypriots to throttle the Turkish Cypriot econoıny".'
1
The third criterion for statehood is to be an effective government. The TRNC has a demoeratic constitution and ali the organs of government. The Constitution of the TRNC sets out a system of separation and of checks and balances betvveen the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary. it consists of 163 Articles and was approved by 70 per cent of the voting public at a referendum held on 5 May 1985. The Constitution prohibits racial diserimination and safcguards the equality of ali individuals before the Ia\v. it observes the princıples of parliamenLary demoeracy, social justice and the is very important, although it is related to the laws of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus. The follovving statement from this case is evidence of the existence of an effective government in Northern Cyprus: "There is an effective administration in northern Cyprus, vvhich has made lavvs governing the day to day lives of the people. According to these lavvs, the people who have occupied these hotels in Kyrenia are not trespassers. They are not occupying them unlavvfully. They are occupying them by virtue of a lease granted to them under the lavvs or by virtue of requisitions made by the existing administration".
74
The fourth criterion for statehood vvith respect to the traditional requirements of statehood is independence (a capacity to enter into relations vvith other States), in this context, the independence of the TRNC vvas criticised by International lavvyers. The Greek Cypriot side asserts that "invasion" and "continued occupation" by Turkey destroys the independence of this State, in response, the Turkish side insists that the Turkish forces are in Northern Cyprus at the request, and vvith the consent, of the effective administration of the territory. The reason for the existence of the Turkish forces in Northern Cyprus is to protect the Turkish Cypriots. After a solution is found, they vvill no longer be settled in Cyprus. 7 As regards to the Turkish intervention in 1974 it should be remembered that it was made in accordance vvith the' 1960 treaties. in particular, Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee gave the right to each guarantor power to intervene in Cvprus in order to maintain the status quo set out betvveen the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities on the Island in 196().
A "Turkey exercised its rights in 1974 by invading the island follovving a coup d'etat organised by the Greek military dictatorship against Cvprus legitimate govemment".' 9 in this sense, there is one important point whiclı is ignored by the international community and international lawycrs, which is. that it is common opinion that the TRNC was created as a result of the use of illegal force, thus the TRNC cannot be seen as a State."" One of the most fundamental principles of international lavv is the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State in international relations (Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter). For this reason, a State created as a result of illegal use of force is not in accordance vvith the principles of international lavv. Such a State depends directly upon this illegal intervention. in the situation of the Turkish intervention of 1974 these principles of international lav/ cannot be applied to the TRNC for the follovving reasons: Firstly, the 1974 Turkish military intervention vvas not illegal, it vvas made in compliance with the principles of the Treaty of Guarantee. Under this treaty, Turkey had a right and obligation to intervene and to protect the Turkish Cypriots and the Republic of Cyprus. Secondly, the TRNC vvas established on 15 November 1983 (almost nine years after the Turkish intervention). This situation proves that the TRNC vvas not the result of the Turkish intervention of 1974. The TRNC vvas the last step of the process of political and administrative evolution vvhich began in 1963. Finally, relating to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, the TRNC did not oecupy the territory of the Republic of Cyprus as this had already been destroyed by the Greek Cypriots in 1963. Kr> it relied upon this legal basis. Similarly, in the Bangladesh case, the Indian intervention was based upon the violation of human rights by Pakistan in East Bengal (Bangladesh).
86
When the history of the two communities, the Greek coup of July of 1974 and the human rights violation made by the Greek Cypriots 87 are examined, it can be clearly seen that the 1974 Turkish intervention is nothing other than a humanitarian intervention. 81 Necatigil, The Cyprııs Qucstion, pp. 322-326.; Leigh. pp. 57-59. 8: Humanitarian intervention "refcrs to the use of armed force by one state against another for the purpose of saving the livcs or propcrty of the intervcnor's citizens or others in the sccond state or rcseııinsı thcnı from an imminent threat of crave injury" (Ott. p. 313). si Ott, p. 313. 84 Necatigil, "The Cyprus Conflict", p. 69. Wiıh regard to the independcnce of the TRNC one more poiııt vvhich should be noted is that the Turkish forces do not lake part in the adıninistration of the TRNC. On the other hand, there arc also the Greek forces in Southern Cyprus.
1 * This issue has never been criticised in terms of the statehood and recognition of the Greek Cvpriot government by the international community and international lavvyers.* 9 As indicated above, the TRNC was established as a result of evolutionary developments. Since 1963, the Turkish Cypriot people have exercised their own governmental authority and control över the territory of the TRNC.
İn short, the TRNC has the criteria of statehood. in addition lo the traditional requirements of statehood iri international lavv, some other criteria such as permanence, willingness and ability to observe international lavv, a certain degree of civilisation, legal order and sovereignty can be observed in the TRNC's case. Although the TRNC possesses the criteria of statehood, the UN and the international community (except Turkey) have not recognised the TRNC as an independent State. The UN Security Council Resolution of 541 (1983) of 18 November 1983 concluded that the declaration of the TRNC was legally invalid and called upon ali States not to recognise the TRNC. The assessment of the UN Security Council Resolution w ili be made belovv.
The TRNC and Recognition
Before cxamining the legal status of the TRNC as regard to ils recognition, some important facts which are arguable in international lavv need to be explained. These are: "The Treaty of Guarantee and International Lavv", "The Legality of the Turkish Intervention" and "The Right of the Turkish Cypriot People to Self-Determination".
The Treaty of Guarantee and International Law
The Treaty of Guarantee 90 is one of the treaties establishing the Republic of Cyprus. it vvas signed by the UK, Greece, Turkey and the ^ Accordtng to the Foreign Affairs Comnıittee of the House of Commons Report of 7 May 1987 on Cyprus. 'UN estimates, conl'irmed by British sources, suggest that there rcmain about 2.500 regular Greek troops (mainly officers and NCOs) in supporl of a Cypriot National Guard ot betwcen 1 1.000 and 12.000 men. İn addition, there are a substantial ııumbcr of Greek Cypriot rcscrvists. cstimated at about 50.000 by the UN and about 60.000 by the Institute of Strategic Studies'. (para. 58), the level of Turkish troops vvas around 27.500 in December 1986 and that the number of the Turkish Cypriot security force is gencrally regarded to be about 4.500 (para. 137). 89 Necatigil. "The Cyprus Conflict". p. 69.; Nccatigil, The Cyprus Quesliım. pp. 327-328. 1X1 The full text ol this treaty is available in N. Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute.
Republic of Cyprus. it consists of four substantive Articles. According to Article I, the Republic of Cyprus accepted the obligation to maintain 'its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution'. This Article also declared another obligation to the Republic of Cyprus, which is not to participate in any political or economic union with any State, in Article II, Greece, Turkey and the UK recognised and guaranteed 'the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the State of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution'. Under Article III, the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertook the obligation 'to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom'. Lastly, according to Article IV, Greece, Turkey and the UK were accepted as guarantor powers in the case of a breach of the provisions of the treaty.
From the point of the principles of international law, Articles 2 (4) and 103 of the UN Charter reflect an arguable position with the Treaty of Guarantee. Thus, the text of the Article needs to be examined. it states:
"in the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions.
in so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action vvith the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty".
When this Article is interpreted as authorising the use of force, an argument relating to the Treaty of Guarantee arises, whereupon it is against to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter (especially Articles 2 (4) and 103) and to the principles of international law. 91 Firstly, as regard to the peremptory norms (jus cogens) of international law, the legality of the Treaty of Guarantee is arguable. As known from Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 'a treaty is void, if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international lavv. ...a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognised by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and Necatigil, The Cyprus Question, p. 116. which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character'. On the other hand. Article 4 of the Law of Treaties states that 'the Convention applies only to treaties vvhich are concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention \vith regard to such States'. This means that, the Vienna Convention has no retroactive application. For this reason, it cannot apply to the Treaty of Guarantee, vvhich vvas signed in 1960. Hovvever, it is accepted that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reflects the exisling rules (customary rules of international law).
9: Thus, in this paper, the application of the Lavv of Treaties is assumed to the Treaty of Guarantee.
As indicated above, if a treaty is not in compliance vvith a peremptory norm of international lavv it is void. However, what the peremptory nornıs of international lavv are, is not clear. Some suggested examples are: a treaty providing an unlavvful use of force contrary to the provisions of the Charter; a treaty providing slave trade, piracy or genocide. 93 İn this sense, use of force is not against the peremptory norms of international lavv. Since the Treaty of Guarantee does not consist of unlavvful use of force, it cannot be said to be against the international lavv practice, and even to the peremptory norm of international lavv.
Moreover, in the case of Cyprus, reasons for concluding of the Treaty of Guarantee and the circumstances under vvhich it vvas signed should be examined. Thcre is no peremptory norm in international lavv prohibiting intervention. according to a treaty to vvhich the subject State is a party."" The sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, in this context, is restrictcd, because of the treaties establishing the State. The status of the British Sovereign Base areas can be an another example to this restriction.
Secondly, as regard to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, the Treaty of Guarantee creates a number of difficult issues. it states: "Ali Members shall refrain in thcir international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any statc, or in any other manner inconsistent vvith the Purposes of the United Nations".
The Greek Cypriot side argued that under Article 2 (4) of the Charter, Turkey has no right to intervene i.n Cyprus according to the Treaty of Guarantee. This is because, the UN Charter prohibıts use of force* İn Under these circumstances, the issue of whether a military intervention can be in compliance with the Purposes of the United Nations should be discussed. Reisman, 97 suggests that the use of force should not automatically lead to accusations and that any action -coercive or otherwise-must be assessed according to its positive and negative effects on an established order. 98 And he also suggests that "in the construction of Article 2 (4), attention must always be given to the spirit of the Charter and not simply to the letter of a particular provision". 99 When the history of Cyprus and the situation after 1964 are taken into account, the importance of this opinion is clearly realised with regard to the necessity of the use of force in certain situations.
Moreover, while the Treaty of Guarantee is assessed as regard to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, at the same time, Articles 51 and 52 (1) of the Charter should also be considered. Article 51 regulates the conditions of self-defence. Article 52 (1) acknovvledges that 'the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action'. The Charter does not preclude such arrangements or agencies and their activities as long as they are consistent vvith the Purposes and Principles of the UN. Under these regulations, the guarantor povvers, in the Treaty of Guarantee, can act as a 'regional arrangement'. in the case of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee provides a regional arrangement which consists of the use of force in order to achieve its purposes whilst being consistent vvith the Purposes and Principles of the UN." "the necessity to restore the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus established and guaranteed by international agreements". Finally, one more point relating to Article 103 of the UN Charter which should be noted is that even if the provisions of a treaty are in conflict with the Charter, Article 103 of the Charter does not invalidate it. From the interpretation of Article 103, the result that that Treaty being void could hardly be possible. Under the principles of the Charter, the treaty continues to be in force. in this sense, the questions of priority becomes important in international law. 
The Legality of the Turkish intervention
On 15 July 1974 the Greek Coup which was planned and directed from Athens and executed by Greeks officers of the National Guard" 12 on the Island took place." 13 The aim of the coup was to overthrow Archbishop Makarios and then set up a new sovernment which would ünite Cvprus with Greece.'" C.50 S a.3 ECHR AND THE CYPRb'S PROBLEM 161 Agreement for Application of the Treaty of Alliance -as foilows: "... in 1974 the Cyprus independence and territorial integrity were being actively threatened, and the July 15 coup was a manifestation of such threat... Turkey correctly regarded the coup as tantamount to the de facto enosis and the Greek involvement as a breach of the sine qua non of the 1960 agreements, namely the prohibition of enosis (and partition) as embodied in Article III of the Treaty of Guarantee... the coup constituted an 'indirect attack'. As such it was also a violation of both the Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee".
109
As indicated above, the legal base for the Turkish intervention was the Treaty of Guarantee. The position of this Treaty in international law was examined earlier, but one point needs to be discussed in detail. The Greek Cypriot side argued that under the Treaty of Guarantee, the right of military intervention to the guarantor povvers was not possible. it authorised merely peaceful representation and intercession." 0 However, Article IV of the Treaty states a 'right to take action'. Of course, the word "action" does not qualify "military", but in this Treaty, Article IV (1) stipulates for consultation 'with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions'. in this paragraph, the vvord 'measures' can consist of use of force as well as intercession. Moreover, Article IV (2) of the Treaty makes the Turkish position stronger. This is because, it gives a 'right to take action' to the guaranteeing povvers. If merely unilateral intercession had been enough, there would not have been any reason to put the second paragraph of this Article into the Treaty.
1 "
As is vvell knovvn from Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), a treaty should "be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose". When the aim of the Treaty of Guarantee (to forbid any political or economic union of Cyprus vvithin any State) and the history of Cyprus, since 1963, vvere taken into account, it is understood that the most effective guarantee could be nothing other than military intervention. İn addition to these facts, the 1974 Turkish intervention can be accepted as a humanitarian intervention. The Turkish intervention also protected the Greek Cypriols' human rights as v/ell as Turkish Cypriots' hııman rights. Oberling" 4 verifies this point in the follovving: "in any case, the Turkish intervention was perfectly legal, according to the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. ... The Turkish intervention caused the collapse of the haled military dictatorship in Grecce and of the brutal Sampson regime in Cyprus. Ironically, it also saved the lives of many Greek Cypriots and preserved the independence of the Greek Cypriot State. Finally, it ushered in a period of peace on the island vvhich has lasted to this day".
in conclusion, we can say that the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, was in accordance with the spirit of Article 2 (4) and 51 of the UN Charter and therefore was a legal
The Right of the Turkish Cypriot People to Self-Determination
The principle of self-determination has tvvo different meanings: "internal" and "external" şelf determination. Internal self-determination means 'the sovereign equality of existing states, and in particular the right of a statc to choose its own form of government'."
6 On the other hand, external self-determination means 'the right of a people to decide its o\vn future'."' Similarly, Akehurst defines self-determination as "the right of selfdetermination is the right of a people living in a territory to detcrmine the political and legal status of that territory, for example, by setting up a statc of their own or by choosing to becorne part of another state"." s it can be understood from these definitions that the concept of self-determination of peoples is a legal right and can be accepted as a jııs cogeııs norm of international lavv." 9 The reason for this is that the right of peoples to self- determination has a vital importance with regard to the human rights norms in international law.
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There is no doubt about the importance of the right to selfdetermination, but the content of this right is less clear. The content of selfdetermination will not be discussed in this paper. However, in order to understand the right of the Turkish Cypriot people to self-determination, international instruments relating to the right to self-determination need to be indicated.
One of the purposes of the UN, as indicated in Article 1 (2) of the UN Charter, is 'to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace While considering the principle of self-determination the other principle -territorial integrity of States -should be respected. However, this principle is dependent upon the condition whereby such a State has to be 'possessed of a government, representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour'. This condition is clearly indicated in paragraph 7 of the Declaration of Friendly Relations. The base for this condition is that the legitimacy of government has to come from the consent of the governed.
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Taking into consideration the situation of Cyprus, the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus was the exercise of self-determination of the two communities -the Greek CyprioL community and the Turkish Cypriot community-. 122 This fact was described by British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Lennox-Boyd in the following: "it will be the purpose of Her Majesty's Government to ensure that any exercise of self-determination shoııld be effected in sııclı a manner that the Turkish-Cypriot community, no less than the Greek Cypriot community, shall. in the special circumstances of Cyprus, be given freedom to decide for thenıselves their future status". in addition to these facts, tvvo more points should be examined in the case of Cyprus. Firstly, the Greek Cypriot government argues that the Turkish Cypriots are not a 'people', they are a 'minority', thus they are not entitled to exercise the right to self-determination. 1^ This argument does not reflect the reality of the situation (the reasons for this vvere explained above) and the UN resolutions refer to the equality of the tvvo communities in order to achieve a settlement in the Cyprus problem. The Security Council Resolution 367 of 12 March 1975 and resolution 649 of 12 March 1990 are just two examples proving that the Turkish Cypriots are not a 'minority' in Cyprus. 12 " Without accepting the TRNC and the right to self-determination for the Turkish Cypriots, how can a federation -which is the only way to achieve a final settlement -be formed?
127 Secondly, the argument that the right to self-determination cannot be applied any more because the principle only applies to peoples under colonial rule. The resolutions of the General Assembly relating to the Palestinians and the inhabitants of South Africa 128 along with the most recent events in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have proved that the right to self-determination does not only apply to peoples under colonial rule and also that "it is an ongoing right of peoples". 129 Moreover, when the recent history of Cyprus is examined, it can be seen that the position of the Turkish Cypriots between 1964 and 1974 was not different from the position of the Palestinians. Thus, recognising the Greek Cypriot government as a legitimate government of Cyprus and denying the Turkish Cypriots' the right to self-determination are violations of international law obligations. 
The Assessment of the Recognition of the TRNC
Even though the TRNC meets the requirements of statehood with regard to international law it has stili not been recognised by the international community (except Turkey). The most important reason for the act of recognition is that it is considered as a political act of States. States prefer not to recognise a new State if it is not in their interest to do so. When the TRNC was established, only Turkey recognised this State. Pakistan and Bangladesh also wanted to recognise the TRNC, but they were persuaded by the US Government not to recognise this new entity. If these two States had recognised the TRNC, the US aid to these countries would have been cut Furthermore, the UN Organisation did not recognise the TRNC as an independent State, it, in this regard, alvvays follovvs new developments far from the realities of the world. For example, China for thirty years, East Germany for tvventy-five years and Bangladesh for four years were not recognised. in the case of Cyprus, the UN and international community has continued to recognise the Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate government of Cyprus. in fact, The Republic of Cyprus has not existed since The UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) of 18 November 1983 was taken af t er the proclamatior. of the TRNC. The Security Council considered that the Declaration of Independence was "incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee". deplored "the declaration of the Turkish Cypriot authorities of the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus'", and concluded that the Declaration was "legally invalid and calls for its withdrawal" and called upon "ali states not to recognise any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus". This resolution can be strongly criücised for the following reasons:
Firslly, the Declaration was found to be incompatible vvith the 1960 Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee. As is knovvn, the Republic of Cyprus vvas created as a result of the three treaties. Under these treaties, it is obvious that the establishment of the TRNC as an independent State is not consistent with that structure. However, when the resolution vvas taken, the Basic Structure and the 1960 Constitution had not been in operation for 20 years, (since 1963-64). This was because, the Greek Cypriot community had excluded the Turkish Cypriot community from the administration. This does not mean that the 1960 Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee were no longer in force in 1983. While the Security Council indicated the importance of these Treaties, in the case of the establishment of the TRNC, it has not taken the same attitude vvith respect to the conduct of the Greek Cypriot community. The Security Council should have shown the same importance in assessing the compatibility of the Greek Cypriot community vvith these treaties. in this respect, the Security Council had failed. Without having found that the Greek Cypriot community had been "incompatible vvith the 1960 Structure of Cyprus", it should not have found that the Declaration of the TRNC vvas "incompatible" vvith the Treaties. 134 in short, the legal status of the TRNC should not be seen as an illegal entity in international law, since the Republic of Cyprus had already been destroyed by the Greek Cypriots. The establishment of the TRNC was the natural result of this destruction.
Thirdly, while the UN Security Council considered that the establishment of the TRNC was illegal and invalid and also called upon ali States not to recognise the TRNC, it was acting in a judicial capacity. Under the regulations of the UN, the Security Council cannot act as a judicial body. The International Court of Justice is the judicial organ of the UN. For these reasons, the Security Council should not have determined whether the establishment of the TRNC was legally valid or not. 13 '' in addition to the UN Security Council resolution, another factor preventing the recognition of the TRNC has been the intercommunal negotiations. These negotiations stili continue although many States suppose that the recognition of the TRNC could badly affect these intercommunal negotiations.
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On the other hand, it should also be noted that the view of the UN organs considering the recognition of the TRNC is not in compliance with each other. The best example of proving this fact is that the UN Industrial Development Organisation's (UNIDO) trade section has accepted the TRNC as an "official member" of the association. The trade section's guide book mentions "the TRNC as well as Turkey as a member" in addition to Turkey's recognition, being a member of an international organisation such as UNIDO can be seen as a first step towards legal recognition of the TRNC.
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'"" The opinion of Lauterpacht, paras. 45-47. 113 The opinion of Lauterpacht, paras. 51-52.; Necatigil, "The Cyprus Conflict",pp. 71-72. 136 Necatigil. The Cyprus Quesûon, pp. 329-330. 1,7 "Legal Recognition for TRNC", The Turkish Daily News (12 July 1997).
The TRNC and the European Court of Human Rights
As a natural resul t of the UN Security Council Resolution, the ECHR, in its judgements relating to the Northern Cyprus, did not accept the TRNC as an independent State. The case of Loizidou v. Turkey'''* clearly reflects this attitude. in this instance, the applicant, Mrs. Loizidou, complained that her arrest, detention by the Turkish Cypriot administration and the refusal of access to her property, situated in Northern Cyprus were a violation of the European Convention of Human Rights (para. 26). Article 159 (1) (b) of the TRNC Constitution was the base for this case. it states: "... situated within the boundaries of the TRNC on 15 November 1983, shall be the property of the TRNC notwithstanding the fact that they are not so registered in the books of the Land Registry Office; and the Land Registry Office shall be amended accordingly". The ECHR in its decision held that Turkey vvas responsible for the situation of Cyprus on the ground that Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974, and after that time, the Greek Cypriots could not get access to their property situated in Northern Cyprus. 139 in the recent case, Case of Cyprus v. Turkey, Ui) which vvas brought by the Greek Cypriot Administration against Turkey before the ECHR, the Court follovved the reasoning of the rnajority in the Loizidou case and found Turkey guilty of human rights violations of the Greek Cypriot people living in the northern part of the Island before the Turkish military invention took place in 1974. Among others, Turkey vvas found responsible for; failing to investigate the deaths of roughly j. .500 people vvho disappeared in the military invasion, 141 inhuman treatment of the families of missing Greek Cypriots, 14 " denying some 180.000 Greek Cypriots the right to return to their homes, 1 b failure to compensate for loss of property, 144 and interference vvith freedom of religion.
14:ı in line with the Loizidou judgement, the legal base lor finding Turkey responsible lied on the fact that she exercised effective overall control över northern Cyprus through its military presence there.
14 ''
Non-recognition of the TRNC as an independent State by the international community, the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council and the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers in this regard were also taken into consideration by the ECHR to justify its findings. 147 The decisions of the ECHR can be strongly criticised for the following reasons:
Firstly, Turkey's notification relating to the Article 25 of the Convention should have been carefully assessed. it provides that "ft]he recognition of the right of petition extends only to allegations concerning acts or omissions of public authorities in Turkey performed within the boundaries of the territory to which the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey is applicable". Under this reservation, the case did not concern the acts and omissions of Turkey. The TRNC is an independent State and as such, how can Turkey be found responsible for the Cyprus situation? Also, Turkey does not exercise any sovereign rights över the territory of the TRNC. Is it possible for Turkey to be assumed to exercise jurisdiction vvithin the TRNC which has declared its independence? 148 Even if the TRNC is not recognised by the international community, it is possible to bring an action against the TRNC since it has international personality and is entitled to the rights and duties of international law. 149 The practice of the international community confirms this fact. For example, in the Tinoco Arbitration (Great Britain v. Costa Rica),' 30 although Great Britain did not recognise Costa Rica, she made claims against this State, in this arbitration, the arbiter, Judge Thaft held that if an unrecognised body was effective, it was bound by its duties and could be faced with international claims. Similarly, the UK claimed compensation from the unrecognised Taiwan Government (Formosa: Chinese Nationalist Authorities) for damage done to British vessels by Nationalist Forces based in Formosa in 1957.
IM By virtue of this practice in international law, Mrs. Loizidou could have brought her action against the TRNC, but not against Turkey. The view taken by the ECHR in the Case of Cyprus v. Turkey supports this point and it will be discussed below.
Secondly, concerning the Cyprus issue, Turkey is not solely responsible for the current situation in the Island. The UNFICYP has been settled in Similarly. the Turkish Cypriots "are prevented from visiting and occupying their property in southern Cyprus. it might even concern citizens of third countries vvho are prevented from travelling to places where they have property and houses".
1:ı3
Thirdly. although the Court in the Loizidou case accepted the legitimacy of certain legal arrangements and traıısactions, Lvt Article 159 (1) (b) of the TRNC Constitution was not accepted as legally valid. The reason for this praetice is not elear. Judge Pettiti, in his dissenting opinion, deseribes this issue in the follovving terms: "... the Court accepted the validity of measures adopted by the TRNC authorities in tfıe field of civil law, private law and the registration of births, deaths and maniages, without specifying what reasons for distinguıshing between these branehes of law and the lavv governing the use of property justified its decision". in contrast to this decision, the ECHR in the Case of Cyprus v. Turkey did not deploy the same view and held that "remedics available in the "TRNC ir ay be regarded as "domestic remedies" of the respondent State".
1 " in other words, Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution governing the use of property was considered as legally valid. ıy> Furthermore, the legality of the cot.rts of the TRNC for the purposes of adjudicating "civil rights and obligatıons" is "considered to be "established by law" vvith reference to the "constiiutional and legal basis" on vvhich they operate" l:>7 by the ECHR. While referring to these facts, the ECHR also indicates that this vvay of implementing international law rules does not mean that the Court recognises the TRNC's claim to statehood. Turkey with regard to the acceptance of the remedies available in the TRNC and the legality of the courts of the TRNC should be interpreted as accepting the real situation in the Island and confirming the legal status of the TRNC as an independent State. Although the Court repeats, throughout its decision, that the TRNC is not an independent State and not recognised by the international community the way it deployed in the case does not support its justification. 159 As having been mentioned above, the recognition of States is a political act and it does not affect the statehood of an entity in international law. The important thing is that whether the entity in question has necessary criterion to be regarded as an independent State. There is no doubt that the TRNC has ali qualifications in this respect. The practice of the UK is an example of proving this fact; the effective nature of the administration in the northern part of Cyprus has been recognised in various decisions in the UK despite the fact that it was not recognised by the UK Government. Examples of such cases are, Hesperides Hotels Ltd and another v. Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd and another, 160 Polly Peck International plc v. Nadir and others 161 and R v. The Minister of Agriculture. 162 in the Hesperides Case, Lord Denning MR assessed the administration in Northern Cyprus as follows: "There is an effective administration in northern Cyprus which made laws governing the day to day lives of the people. According to these lavvs, the people who have occupied these hotels in Kyrenia are not trespassers. They are not occupying them unlawfully. They are occupying them by virtue of a lease granted to them under the lavvs or by virtue of requisitions made by the existing administration. If an action were brought in the courts of this northern part, alleging trespass to land or to goods, it vvould be bound to fail. it follows inexorably that their conduct cannot be made the subject of a süit in England". 163 This statement was made at the time of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus Government. (As was previously mentioned, the TRNC was not established until on 15 November 1983). The other mentioned cases above confirmed this vievv. 164 Fourthly, the ECHR does not give sufficient vveight to the causes and effects of the events vvhich occurred in Cyprus betvveen 1963 and 1974, moreover lo the developments since the military intervention of Turkey. The judgenıents of the Court does not deal with the legality of the intervention of Turkish forces in northern Cyprus, vvhich shoukl have been the main isstıe to deliver any judgement finding Turkey responsible for the current situation. As the international practice confirms. the Turkish military intervention was lawful and it cannot be seen as aggression in inlernational lavv."* To regard the decisions of the ECHR as consistent vvith the rules of international lavv, the judgenıents should have taken into account the Treaty of Guarantee,"' 7 as one of its consequences the Turkish intervention"' 8 and the right of the Turkish Cypriot people to şelf determination."' 9 Any jııdgemenl ignoring these principies of international lavv in relatioıı to the Cyprus problem nıust be considered as politically motivatcd rather than being legal.
Lastly. the vievv taken by the ECHR in the Casc of Denizci and Others v. Cyprus'" should be noted here. in this judgement, the Court does not agahı give any vveight to the events and factors that is to say that the Turkish Cypriot people either living in the southern part of the Island or crossing fronı the north to the south in order to vvork there are the victim of un lavv ful and arbitrary arrest and detention, victim of inhuman treatment, and of being subject to torture and killings by unknovvn persons. The only reason to face vvith such treatment is the ethnic origin of the Turkish Cypriot people. The ECHR in its judgement does not even imply the existence of such situations. in the vievv of the Court, the Turkish Cypriot people living in the south and in the north are the citizens of the Greek Cypriot administration. and the applicants faced vvith the inhuman f-eatment, unlavvful and arbitrary arrest and detention. violations of freedom of movements. By applying this understanding into the case, the Gree< Cypriot administration is louııd guilty of human rights violations. in other vvords, everything vvas taken into account as if they occurred in one of democratic societies of the vvorld. it does not look at the fact that the Turkish Cypriots living in the south are subject to discriminatory acts just because of their ethnic origins. understanding, which ignores the TRNC and its people, and its application by the ECHR in this dırection may damage the credibility of the Court.
Conclusions
As having been mentioned in this paper, since 1963 there has not been a State representing the whole island of Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus, which was established under the three multilateral treaties (the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance), lasted for only three years after its establishment. The two separate administrations, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot administration, ha ve replaced the Republic of Cyprus. Hovvever, the international community has continued to recognise the Greek Cypriot government as the legitimate government of Cyprus. Under these conditions, the Turkish Cypriots had to establish their own states. The Declaration of the TRNC on November 1983 vvas a natural result of the process of the separate political identification of the Turkish Cypriot community.
When the recent history of Cyprus is examined it can clearly be seen that the legal status of the TRNC is not any less legal than its Greek Cypriot counterpart with regard to its statehood and recognition in international law. The traditional requirements of statehood contained in the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) -vvhich are, a permanent population, a defined territory, an effective government and a capacity to enter into relations vvith other States (independence) -ali exist in the case of the TRNC. An entity vvhich satisfies these conditions is accepted as a State vvhether its statehood is recognised by the international community or not. Recognition does not affect the concept of statehood according to the declaratory theory vvhich is supported by the majör jurists and international practice. The most recent practices of States, in the recognition of the former republics of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are proof of the fact that recognition is seen as a political act of the executive branches of States rather than a legal concept. in any international law ground. Sincs the ECHR does not give any weight to the facts which we indicated in this paper its judgements cannot be considered as in compliance with the rules of international law and in particular, with the Treaties that gave birth to the Republic of Cyprus. The approach taken by the ECHR may also damage the credibility of such an international institution that delivers landmark decisions in relation to the violations of humarı rights.
Lastly. it should also be noted that if the ECHR continues to deliver its judgements in the same vein, it does not help to the Cypriot people, either Greek or Turkish origin, to reach a final settlement of the Cyprus problem. The vievv deployed by the Court makes even more difficult to keep both communities in the same negotiation table to find a peaceful solution to the issue. The international community wants to see the Cyprus problem solvcd and becanıe the vvhole island as a member of the EU. The ECHR should have also taken this factor into its account before delivering its judgements concerning the Cyprus case.
